The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Honors Theses

Honors College

5-2021

To Suppress Riots and Insurrections: Development and
Transformation in Mississippi’s State Militia, 1865-1890
Alec J. Blaylock

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/honors_theses
Part of the History Commons

To Suppress Riots and Insurrections: Development and Transformation in Mississippi’s
State Militia, 1865-1890

by

Alec J. Blaylock

A Thesis
Submitted to the Honors College of
The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment
of Honors Requirements

May 2021

iii

Approved by:

Dr. Susannah Ural, Ph.D.Ph.D., Thesis Advisor,
School of HumanitiesHumanities

Dr. Matthew Casey, Ph.D.Ph.D., Director,
School of HumanitiesHumanities

Ellen Weinauer, Ph.D., Dean
Honors College

iii

ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that Mississippi’s state militia after the American Civil War
developed into a functional arm of the state to supplant extralegal paramilitary groups.
However, that militia transformed between 1865 and 1890 from an organization devoted
to protecting African-American political and civil rights into a mechanism for the
enforcement of white supremacy. Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 made the governor
Commander-in-Chief of the state militia and designated that one of the militia’s
responsibilities was “to suppress riots and insurrections.” While the law provided other
reasons for using the militia, this thesis argues that Mississippi’s governors only used the
militia to put down alleged riots and insurrections, while contemporary newspapers used
the terms “riot” and “insurrection” to associate criminality with African-American
political activism. This thesis also narrates the life of an African-American man named
Oliver Cromwell and his presence at two representative “race riots” in the Clinton Riot of
1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 to highlight how the militia impacted
individual citizens. Ultimately, this work concludes that the transformation of
Mississippi’s state militia between 1865 and 1890 reveals how civilian access to the
militia’s ranks and how the governor chose to deploy that militia impactfully reduced
African-American rights in late-nineteenth century Mississippi and contributed to the
disenfranchisement found in the state’s Constitution of 1890.
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Introduction
In 1843, Julia Cromwell gave birth to a mixed-race son in Wilkinson County,
Mississippi and prophetically named him Oliver. Like his European namesake who
sparked England’s Civil War in the seventeenth century, Mississippi’s Oliver Cromwell
grew up to fan the flames of racial politics in his native state for decades after the
American Civil War. By the time he was twenty years old, Cromwell served in the 5th
United States Colored Heavy Artillery regiment in the American Civil War. In his early
thirties, he paraded the streets of Clinton, Mississippi in full military regalia as a leader of
an African-American militia before participating in one of the most notorious race riots in
the state’s history. Fourteen years later, the state militia of which he was once a member
ran him out of Mississippi. Finally, the illustrious troublemaker died in a hail of gunfire
while taking out five Ku Klux Klan members as a parting gift. Cromwell lived up to his
name and remained at the center of political and racial turmoil in Mississippi throughout
his life, coming to represent the broader societal changes occurring therein.
Cromwell’s life illustrates significant historical shifts in Mississippi. From the
Civil War to the formation of Jim Crow in the 1890s, Mississippi saw racial and political
uncertainty on an unprecedented scale, and civilian militias became a prominent
mediating force. This work will explore how Mississippi’s state militia, as developed
after emancipation in 1865, shaped the way that political parties fought for and projected
their power in Mississippi through the ratification of the state’s next, and current,
constitution written in 1890. The period between the end of the Civil War and the
establishment of Jim Crow control in the South often reads as a history of unique
Democratic Party, and consequently white, patterns of violence bent on establishing
14

white supremacy and political hegemony. However, this research will complicate that
narrative by exploring how the Democratic Party of the late 1870s and 1880s utilized the
state militia in the same fundamental way that the Republican Party did in the 1860s.
Namely, both parties employed the state militia to reassert control when challenges
confronted their political hold on the state government. The difference, then, was the
Republican Party’s use of the militia to protect African American rights, whereas the
Democratic Party sought to solidify white supremacy.
Oliver Cromwell’s life represents how the state’s politics changed from the Civil
War to 1890, and how the militia took an active role in that change. After tumultuous
extralegal militia skirmishes during Presidential Reconstruction (1865-1868), the
Constitution of 1868 clarified the distinction between legal and illegal militias, and
placed state militia operations in the governor’s hands. The militia then became an
inescapably political tool. As Republican Party power waned in the mid-to-late 1870s,
Republican governor Adelbert Ames mustered the militia in a vain attempt to retain
control of the capital and to remind citizens of his party’s continued hold on power. By
1890, the Democratic party once again dominated Mississippi politics, yet rising
Republican sentiment both in the state and in the rest of the country pushed an uneasy
Democratic governor Robert Lowry to raise the state’s militia once again.
Two specific instances reveal the overarching purpose of Mississippi’s state
militia. The first is the Clinton Riot of 1875, where African-American militia units
played important roles both during and after the riot to protect their lives and Republican
political interest. The other example is the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 in Leflore
County, Mississippi where, conversely, white militia units were called upon to represent
14

the Democratic Party. Both events saw a political party employing militia units to defend
their interests, yet both militias failed to ensure peace or put down hostilities. Militia
deployment, then, built on the idea that force could be used if necessary, though troops
were almost never sent to areas where violence had been threatened or performed.
Both the Clinton Riot and the Leflore County Massacre also reveal the central
controversy of Mississippi’s late nineteenth century politics: race. Long before W. E. B.
Du Bois famously stated that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the
color-line,” one Mississippi writer assigned the same problem to the nineteenth century,
arguing that “the issue in this State is one of race.”1 The militia walked hand in hand with
politics; political parties, however, were also tied directly to race. Though exceptions
certainly existed, one may safely generalize that the Democratic Party represented white
citizens, while the Republican Party represented black citizens. The militia’s political
roots then tied it heavily to race relations. The militia thereby simultaneously embodied
both political and racial division in Mississippi.
The racial component of Mississippi’s state militia reveals one of its most
important contributions in the late nineteenth century. An examination of the state’s
militia is necessarily an examination of the position of African Americans in the state.
The presence of African American militia units, let alone their actions, symbolizes the
empowerment of black people in Mississippi during Reconstruction and under a
Republican government. The use of white militias to suppress black political organization

1

W.E.B. Du Bois. The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes and Noble Books,
2003), 16.; “The Mississippi Troubles: A Truthful Statement of the Situation: Number 1,”
The Weekly Mississippi Pilot, September 25, 1875, 2.
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in Leflore County in 1889 conversely embodies the diminishment of civil rights brought
on by Democratic political majority in the development of an oppressive Jim Crow
regime. The language of legislation concerning the militia in both the 1868 and 1890
state constitutions offers insight on both how the militia was used and why. By including
the phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections” into the list of reasons for militia
deployment, the governor could either represent any racial conflict (which in Mississippi
could be counted on at the time) as a “riot” to deploy militia and reinforce control, or
engineer a racial conflict for the expressed purpose of inciting violence and militia use, as
the Democratic Party often did.2
This thesis will argue that between 1865 and 1890, both the Democratic and
Republican parties in Mississippi utilized the state militia to enforce and symbolize party
control; however, the militia transformed during that period from an organization to
protect and empower African Americans to an organization bent on their suppression and
disenfranchisement. The militia thereby operated in the same way, but for stark opposite
purposes. Chapter One will closely examine how the Clinton Riot of 1875 represented
Republican and African-American attempts to sustain the rights won in emancipation by
using legal state militia units. Chapter Two will track the militia’s status under
Democratic governor Robert Lowry, exploring the ways fusion politics and Democratic
Party insecurity produced the militia’s resurrection at the Leflore County Massacre of
1889. By focusing on those two events, this work will track the militia’s changes over

2

Constitution of the State of Mississippi, Adopted May 15, 1868, Article IX, Sec.
5; Constitution of the State of Mississippi, Adopted November 1, 1890, Article IX, Sec.
217.
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time while highlighting the functional continuities between political parties that exercised
the right to wield the militia’s power.

Historiographical Contribution
Though technically a military organization, the state militia’s scope extended to all
spheres of civilian life when mobilized. Consequently, this examination of Mississippi’s
state militia in the contentious period between 1865 and 1890 will contribute to the
economic, military, political, racial, and social history of the state. Furthermore, citizensoldiering and the suppression of “race riots” real or imagined remains a highly prevalent
and debated issue in the United States today, so studying the way that everyday citizens
of different races interacted with their respective governments to militarize civilian life
may offer insight on historically persistent racial, social, and political issues. While much
has been written on Mississippi, its laws, racial division, and politics, little material exists
incorporating the state militia into that history, and an even smaller amount has been
written with the militia at the center.
Though several works reference Mississippi’s state militia as a passing contributor in
a much larger historical narrative, this work will expand the lens on the militia as a much
more important agent. The militia’s centrality to the period is twofold: first, the militia
actively contributed to events, such as riots, when they happened, and second, the militia
offers a symbol of the overarching societal changes in the state. Citizens who formed the
militia and the governor who controlled it shaped the racial, political, and social future of
the state by either their participation in or exclusion from the militia. Both the active and

14

symbolic nature of the organization thereby warrant close, specific study that has seldom
been done.
The Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 fall neatly into
this study as two representative examples of militia activity over time. Both events have
been studied thoroughly in isolation, yet this study seeks to examine them in conjunction.
By placing the events side-by-side, similarities and differences may be drawn which
reveal larger historical truths about the militia’s importance to Mississippi in an age of
racially motivated violence. Specifically studying the militia’s standing across both riots
at the same time further informs the history of each separate event. By looking at the riots
together, one may see not only why the events happened, but how one aspect of
Mississippian life, the state militia, could contribute to and perpetuate political systems
which catalyzed violence over the span of twenty years.
Another important, yet less tangible, way that this work will contribute to the existing
literature is by examining contemporary ideas about civilian-based military organizations.
While it is impossible to know how each individual thought, one blanket ideology occurs
frequently in contemporary newspapers and letters. Both during and after the Civil War,
southern whites developed a patent distaste for peacetime militia organization,
associating organized forces with despotic standing armies. This paranoia spiked greatly
with the inception of black militia units during Reconstruction, yet as will be shown,
arguments over the constitutionality of peacetime militias, regardless of race, continued
into the state constitutional debates of 1890.

14

State Militia
This study will most directly contribute to the historiography of the state militia in
Mississippi by centering its narrative around that organization. Little direct research has
been done specifically on Mississippi’s state militia or state militias otherwise, yet a few
valuable studies exist. Otis A. Singletary’s Negro Militia and Reconstruction offers the
most specific, targeted examination of state militias, particularly African American units,
in Reconstruction. Published in 1957, Singletary’s book is dated, yet in many cases the
book fairly divides the blame for the violence of the period on both white and black
forces. Singletary argues that black militia units, though empowering to black people in
the South, also heightened antagonism from whites solely by their existence. The book
provides a useful analysis of the Clinton Riot of 1875 and specific details on the militia’s
role during and after the riot. Despite its age, Negro Militia and Reconstruction remains
one of the most thorough accounts of its subject. This study will build on Singletary’s by
providing greater context for Reconstruction militias and by more closely examining their
ramifications into the post-Reconstruction era.3
Andrew F. Lang’s In the Wake of War: Military Occupation, Emancipation, and
Civil War America provides a more recent examination of militia usage in the South after
the Civil War. Lang’s book studies the process of military occupation by the United
States as it developed through the Mexican American and Civil wars. Lang closely
examines how citizen-soldiering, at first viewed by whites as a valorous enterprise,
became a nuisance in the minds of whites after the extensive occupations of the Civil

3

Otis A. Singletary, Negro Militia and Reconstruction (Austin, University of
Texas Press, 1957).
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War. However, African Americans, after achieving freedom from slavery in that war,
embraced militia participation to protect their newly won rights and to exercise
autonomy. This research gives insight particularly into the ideologies concerning militia
usage and peacetime occupation and provides a thorough account of African American
militia involvement during Reconstruction. This thesis will rely on Lang’s arguments
connecting Civil War experiences, concepts of citizenship, and armed militia
participation. However, this work will also extend those ideas further into Reconstruction
and New South era to explore how citizen-soldiering as a fundamental part of
Mississippians’ experience extended well beyond Lang’s timeline. 4

Civil Conflicts in Mississippi
While the primary focus of this work will be the state militia, that militia’s history
cannot be separated from the individual histories of civil conflicts in Mississippi. The
state of Mississippi experienced frequent bloody conflicts in the late nineteenth century.
While many of these instances have been researched to varied degrees, this thesis
contributes to their historiography by adding further details about each respective conflict
and by linking those conflicts together in one purposeful framework.
No previous literature pairs the Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County
Massacre of 1889 together, yet researchers have written on both separately. Nicholas
Lemann’s Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War offers a detailed narrative of the
overthrow of Mississippi’s Reconstruction government. Lemann specifically addresses

4

Andrew F. Lang, In the Wake of War: Military Occupation, Emancipation, and
Civil War America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2017).
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the Clinton Riot of 1875, events leading up to the riot, the aftermath, and where black
militia units fit into each of the events. Leman relies heavily on the drama of the period to
engage a popular audience; however, his usage of specific names, dates, and primary
sources from the period, particularly from Republican Governor Adelbert Ames, offers a
broad portrait of how and why the Reconstruction government of Mississippi was forced
out of the state. This thesis adds further context to Lemann’s by placing it within a
greater conceptual and historical framework. While Lemann primarily focuses on the
narrative of events, this work places those events within the context of broad historical
change and uses a far longer timeline by which to track the ramifications of the
Redemption movement and the state militia’s role therein.5
Melissa Jones’s article “The Clinton Riot of 1875: From Riot to Massacre” offers
another detailed exploration of the event and its legacy. More specifically, she draws
upon personal accounts of how White Line paramilitaries murdered Black
Mississippians. Jones also provides an excellent discussion of the Clinton Riot in
historical memory, examining narratives taught through local historical markers and in
scholarship. The article also discusses the subtle linguistic impacts of a conflict being
described as either a “riot” or a “massacre,” supporting this work’s claims that such
subtle differences affected the deployment of state militia units. Jones’s article gives a
brief overview of the events at Clinton and their importance, yet this thesis will build on
her work by expanding the timeline to show how paramilitary developments from the
time of emancipation produced the Clinton Riot. Furthermore, this work will place the

5

Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).
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Clinton Riot in conversation with other race riots of the period to reveal broader historical
change occurring in late nineteenth century Mississippi with the militia at the forefront.6
William F. Holmes wrote the definitive account of the Leflore County Massacre
to date with his article “The Leflore County Massacre and the Demise of the Colored
Farmers’ Alliance.” Holmes offers a descriptive narrative of the Massacre’s root causes
and consequences. Holmes, however, narrows his focus to the context of its influence on
the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, a Black Populist organization in the state led by none
other than Oliver Cromwell. While he recognizes the limits of researching such a
disputed event, Holmes offers a thorough study of the Massacre which utilizes facts from
contemporary newspapers both from Mississippi and across the country to piece together
a reliable account. Like the Jones’s article on the Clinton Riot, this thesis will build on
Holmes’s work by drawing from unused primary resources to contribute detail and by
examining the greater context within which the Leflore County Massacre occurred. This
study also places the state militia, rather than the Colored Farmers’ Alliance, squarely at
the center of the event to produce a new historical lens for that event’s importance.7
Two doctoral dissertations provide unique lenses by which to view the events
discussed in this work. Melinda Meek Hennessy’s “To Live and Die in Dixie:
Reconstruction Race Riots in the South” chronicles and examines every race riot, within
a certain mold, which took place during Reconstruction. Her work includes a lengthy

Melissa Janczewski Jones, “The Clinton Riot of 1875: From Riot to Massacre”
(Jackson: Mississippi History Now, The Mississippi Historical Society, 2015).
7
William F. Holmes, “The Leflore County Massacre and the Demise of the
Colored Farmers’ Alliance,” Phylon, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Atlanta: Clark Atlanta University
Press, 1973), 267-274.
6
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examination of the Clinton Riot of 1875 in Mississippi, which includes extraordinary
detail, research, and contextualization. While her treatment of the Clinton Riot only exists
as a small portion of a much larger study, it nevertheless offers a thorough account and
useful commentary on the Clinton Riot as one of many other race riots in the south. By
connecting the Clinton Riot to the Leflore County Massacre, this thesis consequently
expands on Hennessy’s work by revealing how certain elements of Reconstruction race
riots carried over into racial politics of the New South.8
William Bland Whitley’s “Precious Memories: Narrative of the Democracy in
Mississippi 1865-1915” traces the Democratic Party’s political and social tactics as it
developed from the end of the Civil War, through Reconstruction, and ultimately to the
Jim Crow Era. Whitley’s study on the Democratic Party’s successful Redemption
campaign of 1875-1876 discusses in specific detail the Clinton Riot of 1875 and the
racial conflicts leading up to and stemming from the event. While Whitley’s study
focuses on larger themes, his examination of the Democratic Party’s rhetoric in the period
and its method of appealing to external issues (such as religion) to establish white
supremacy offers a unique insight into the conflicts of the mid-1870s. His work explores
the ways that race riots, specifically the Clinton Riot, were depicted by Democratic
newspapers to demonize African Americans, making the dissertation useful in
establishing a holistic picture of the event. This thesis then draws on Whitley’s readings

8

Melinda Meek Hennessy, To Live and Die in Dixie: Reconstruction Race Riots
in the South (Ohio: Doctoral Dissertation at Kent State University, 1978).
14

and offers further evidence to prove how newspaper accounts manipulated rhetoric to
criminalize and undermine black political organization.9

Race in Mississippi
A central historiographical contribution of this work will be race as tied to both
the state militia and civil conflict in Mississippi. Fortunately, a wealth of important
research exists on the subject, specifically within the timeline of this study. Stephen
Cresswell’s Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After Reconstruction 18771917 offers a broad portrait of Mississippi’s politics, social life, and especially race in the
contentious period after Reconstruction. Cresswell’s book builds on existing New South
literature by examining the specific ways that Mississippi could undergo economic,
political, and racial change affecting the entire south while remaining fundamentally
untouched in making true advancement. Cresswell excels in examining “race riots” and
exploring contradictions between the events and their narratives as written by
newspapers. The book also touches on the militia’s use in the state, specifically in the
Leflore County Massacre and in the later Jim Crow Era. This thesis will then build on
Cresswell’s book by closely examining how the state militia influenced and was
influenced by Mississippi’s New South prospects.10
Another major work uncovering racial history in late nineteenth century
Mississippi is Omar Ali’s In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South 1886-

9

William Bland Whitley, Precious Memories: Narratives of the Democracy in
Mississippi 1865-1915 (Florida: Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Florida, 2003).
10
Stephen Edward Cresswell, Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After
Reconstruction 1877-1917 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006).
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1900. Ali closely examines the rise, prosperity, and fall of the Black Populist Movement
in the South, arguing that the Black Populists were an autonomous political entity without
reliance on the larger white Populist movement. Ali’s book sheds light on an otherwise
little studied movement, and his attention to detail and scrupulous mining of sources
presents unique information that would otherwise be hard to find. His research on the
Leflore County Massacre, an incident which gravitated around the Colored Farmers’
Alliance (a Black Populist organization) and the life of Oliver Cromwell offers extensive
detail on the Massacre, its causes, its effects, and how the racial politics of the age
intermingled therein.11
A premier work on racial history in Mississippi is Neil R. McMillen’s Dark
Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow, which offers one of the most
broad, extensive examinations of the African American experience in Mississippi in the
Jim Crow Era. McMillen’s work looks at race history uniquely from the bottom-up, black
perspective, focusing on the efforts of African Americans to secure their rights,
strengthen their communities, and fight racism in Jim Crow Mississippi. Though this
study precedes the Jim Crow Era, McMillen’s study incorporates the legacies of
Reconstruction and Redemption, and his work also contributes general information on
black life in Mississippi that is crucial to any research on racial history in the state. This
thesis will then build on McMillen’s already extensive work by placing the state militia in
a more central role in shaping the Jim Crow’s development than does Dark Journey.12

Omar H. Ali, In the Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South 1886-1900
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2010).
12
Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow
(University of Illinois Press, 1990).
14
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New South
Though less directly, this thesis will also build on studies of the New South. Two
important works on the history of the New South offer crucial insight into understanding
both the world created by Redemption and the overarching historical narratives that
produced the Leflore County Massacre. First, C. Vann Woodward’s landmark Origins of
the New South: 1877-1913 surveys the development and perpetuation of the New South
from Reconstruction through the early years of the Jim Crow Era. Woodward offers
critical insights on the Democratic Party’s role in southern states, especially in
Mississippi, revealing insecurities within the party that lead to events like the Leflore
County Massacre. Woodward also traces important continuities between the first and
second “Mississippi Plans” as they were called in the period, both of which bolstered
white Democratic influence in Mississippi. This work uses Woodward’s narrative but
contributes a unique reading in its specificity to Mississippi and its focus on the state
militia therein. 13
The second work on the New South pivotal to understanding the world of the
Leflore County Massacre is Edward L. Ayers’s The Promise of the New South: Life after
Reconstruction. Ayers, like Woodward, traces continuities from Reconstruction through
the Jim Crow Era, examining the promises southern governments made and how those
promises manifested. Ayers’s work provides useful insights on the divisions between

13

C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877-1913. A History of the
South, Vol. IX, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, The Littlefield Fund for
Southern History at The University of Texas, 1951).
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citizens and their representatives in government, highlighting the failure of many New
South governments to fulfill their promises of prosperity. As the state militia in
Mississippi and elsewhere was composed of citizens rather than professional soldiers,
understanding how such citizens of any race lived and experienced change on a day-today basis offers an extra layer of understanding about motivations and experiences in the
New South. This thesis will contribute to both Ayers’ and Woodward’s works by
examining how the modernizing influences of the New South era produced direct interest
in a more organized and professional state militia in Mississippi.14

Mississippi History
Since this work focuses solely on militias in Mississippi, it necessarily contributes
to the state’s historiography. For many years, textbooks and monographs on Mississippi’s
history documented events like the Civil War and Reconstruction through blatantly Lost
Cause lenses. Such scholarship painted the Confederate cause as a virtuous fight for
states’ rights while neglecting slavery’s influence in producing the Civil War. Lost Cause
ideologues furthermore depicted the Reconstruction era as a total failure, blaming both
Republican and African-American officials for corrupting governments and incurring
massive debts for southern states. However, more modern research has sought to correct
those ills and provide a truthful and largely accurate narrative. One recent general study
of Mississippi consulted for this work is Dennis J. Mitchell’s A New History of
Mississippi. Mitchell’s book studies Mississippi but moves beyond Lost Cause narratives

14

Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life after Reconstruction.
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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which so tainted earlier works. Mitchell’s book discusses Reconstruction in a broad but
informative way, offering a basic understanding of a complex period in state history.
However, Mitchell’s work is necessarily broad, so this thesis will provide specific details
and a greater study of the state militia’s role in events that Mitchell covers only for their
broader historical significance.15
Though not a general history, Dorothy Overstreet Pratt’s Sowing the Wind: The
Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 minutely examines one of the state’s most
important historical events. The Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890 and the
legislation it produced would dramatically alter the state’s future and create a legacy that
persists today. Scrupulously studying each aspect of the constitution which changed from
its predecessors, Pratt incorporates into her work details such as the state militia as a
provision in the constitution while tracing how events such as the Leflore County
Massacre influenced the legislators of the convention. The state militia, as this study will
show, played a pivotal role in pushing the state toward that new constitution, and this
thesis consequently provides further context for Pratt’s work.16
A crucial work on Mississippi’s history, specifically during Reconstruction, is
William C. Harris’s The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in
Mississippi (1979). Harris’s work is dated and highly influenced by the period in which it
was written; however, though some of the interpretations are clearly biased, the book
offers a wealth of factual evidence. Studying militia movements all the way through

15

Dennis J. Mitchell, A New History of Mississippi (Jackson: University Press of
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Reconstruction will thereby provide a new, necessary update to some of Harris’s
arguments.17
Methodology
This study draws heavily upon the partisan political press in Mississippi during
the 1870s and 1880s. Newspapers of the period abound, offering in many cases some of
the only primary accounts of local incidents. Any attempt to recreate an account of either
the Clinton Riot or the Leflore County Massacre requires one to draw heavily from
contemporary newspapers. While an excellent source for first-hand opinions and
accounts, the newspapers in Mississippi describing both events are somewhat
problematic. Newspapers of the period, as noted by Nicholas Lemann, “were,
unapologetically, political party organs.”18 While ample evidence can be drawn from
newspapers to reconstruct basic events, the bitter partisanship of the day carried over into
those papers. For example, newspapers covering an instance of racially motivated
violence would narrate how the violence started in different ways depending on whether
the paper’s editor was a Republican or Democrat. However, though highly partisan
papers can often be unreliable when searching for overt truth, they are incredibly useful
for gauging both public and party opinions. Newspapers, particularly out of Jackson,
Mississippi, will be drawn from heavily, but in a way that attempts to locate concrete
facts and to appropriately label opinion masquerading as fact. A useful source for
checking unsubstantiated newspaper claims will be the Congressional investigations that

17

William C. Harris, The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in
Mississippi (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).
18
Lemann, Redemption, 36.
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occurred in Mississippi following both the Vicksburg and Clinton Riots, providing
eyewitness testimony from those involved and conclusions from third-party
congressional investigators.19
Legislation will also play a crucial role in this or any study of the state militia in
the period. Mississippi’s last two constitutions (1868 and 1890) provide an overarching
framework for this study. As an arm of the state, the militia must be studied first in terms
of its legislated purposes, even if used differently in reality. While both constitutions
provide the overarching legislation regarding the militia, smaller laws and executive
orders also greatly influenced the way that the militia operated, who could join, how the
militia was funded, and why a person would have wanted to join. For example, while the
Constitution of 1868 provided a general framework for the militia, a much more
descriptive law (to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter) was passed in 1870
to offer the governor a heavier hand in wielding its power. Smaller executive orders and
laws passed by the legislature crop up in both the 1870s and 1880s dictating the minutiae
of the militia. Newspapers often listed such laws along with highly opinionated
commentaries, and this work will continue to draw heavily from newspapers to find the
exact wording of minor laws.
Personal correspondence will also play a major role in this study. The primary
mode of interpersonal communication in the era, personal letters between two citizens
and especially from citizens to the governor place a finger on the pulse of public opinion.

19

George S. Boutwell, Mississippi in 1875 Report of the Select Committee to
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The personal accounts of angry and scared citizens making desperate pleas to the
governor or to investigators furnish a personal lens through which to reconstruct
narratives of Reconstruction and its aftermath. Personal letters also offer insider access to
public opinion on such controversial issues as race riots and militia service (particularly
African American militia service). The Adelbert Ames Collection at the Mississippi
Department of Archives and History is therefore a crucial source base for this project by
providing Governor Ames’s personal letters and government documents. Ames and his
wife, Blanche Butler Ames, also carried on near daily correspondence that has been
published in two volumes, offering crucial insight into the motivations of Governor
Ames, one of the key characters in this study. 20
An important functional designation on the term “militia” must be made before
moving forward in this study. Chapter One examines the early stages of militia activity
after emancipation in 1865 and thus necessarily discusses paramilitary organization at
some length. However, that discussion occurs to provide necessary contextual
information for how the state militia operated after 1868. The entirety of this work after
the implementation of the 1868 constitution refers to and studies the legal state militia
under the governor’s constitutional authority. The distinction between state and
paramilitary militias was important in that Black Mississippians relied on a clear
distinction between the two. After 1868, black Mississippians sought to enroll in the state
militia for armed protection and often refused to fight otherwise. Their white neighbors,
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however, armed themselves regardless of state sanction. Both communities thereby saw
that the differences between state and paramilitary militias and their choices of which to
use produced real consequences. While many “militias” existed in the state, both black
and white, extralegal or informal militia units such as the White Line groups of the 1870s
or the ever-popular “posses” of the later Jim Crow Era will be identified as such and are
not to be interpreted within this work’s argument on how the state militia impacted
society and transformed over time.
This project incorporates several different types of history (social, military,
economic, legislative, etc.), as the state militia impacted numerous arenas in
Mississippians’ daily lives. The militia could only be deployed only by the governor,
making it a governmental and legislative issue, yet ordinary citizens enlisted in and paid
for the militia with their taxes, creating a social and economic issue. Furthermore, given
the highly contentious climate of the period, race and political party were directly bound
to militia movements, making a history of the militia a racial, military, and political
history. Rather than examine each individual element separately, this project will portray
the militia broadly and treat such topics as economics, race, and military involvement as
their prominence in the militia’s activity increased. Using this wide historical lens will
provide an overall picture of both how and why the militia transformed between 1868 and
1890 while addressing the far-reaching impacts on the state of Mississippi which resulted
from that transformation.

14

Chapter I
On July 27, 1863, twenty-year-old Oliver Cromwell from Wilkinson County,
Mississippi enlisted in the 5th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery.21 Cromwell’s experience
fighting for his own freedom against the Confederacy represents a much wider
experience shared by many African Americans in the South during the latter half of the
Civil War. Holding a weapon and fighting against oppressors produced a newfound sense
of independence in formerly enslaved African Americans and radically affected the ways
that they would view the administration of post-Civil War justice.22 In the mid-1870s,
Cromwell would personally see an African American state militia, devastating race riots,
and the Republican Party’s last grasp at political control in Mississippi.
As Andrew Lang notes in his study of Civil War occupations, the Union Army’s
occupation of the South shattered many white citizens’ beliefs about the nobility of the
citizen-soldier while convincing their Black neighbors that citizenship and military
service were inextricably linked. Lang argues that “while white Union soldiers debated
the ideological implications of peacetime occupation, African-American troops, as they
had during the war, continued to believe that the army could and should be used to
reshape the racial and social landscapes of the postwar South.”23 Thus, the military
experience of Civil War service both philosophically and practically altered African
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American militia activity in the postwar period. Philosophically, black people in the
South came to see the army and state militia as viable sources to enforce the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Practically, many
African Americans acquired knowledge and often possession of weapons, owned military
uniforms, and fought in racially segregated military formations. The African Americans
who would form post-war militias did so with heightened senses of independence and
desires to fight for their rights. As early as 1865, former United States Army general Carl
Schurz noted that “There is nothing that will make [African American freedom] more
evident than the bodily presence of a negro with a musket on his shoulder.”24 Many
whites in both the North and South recognized the same correlation between freedom and
military participation and consequently grew anxious about such enforcement.
After losing the Civil War and experiencing the occupation of their cities,
southern whites profoundly feared the new independence of African Americans,
particularly in states like Mississippi with predominantly black populations. Nicholas
Lemann aptly notes that “the idea of an organized, authoritative, and potentially violent
Negro force touched upon every ancient white fear…about what might happen if Negroes
were able to do to whites what whites had done to them.”25 Thus, a racialized fear of any
form of African American power, particularly militarized power, petrified white
southerners in the helplessness felt after the Civil War. Those white southerners would
then unjustifiably see black militia units, or any state-sanctioned militia, as a threat to
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their independence, summoning time-honored American fears of a standing army in
peacetime.
White fears of black uprisings reached a fever pitch almost immediately after
emancipation. In December of 1865, debates over land distribution revealed how, for
black Mississippians, political rights could not be separated from armed enforcement.
Historian Steven Hahn notes that in late 1865, “among freedpeople, rumors had been
spreading” of “a federal plan to confiscate and redistribute the property of ex-Confederate
landowners.”26 This rumor then sparked white rumors “of a coming race war in which
armed ex-slaves…would rise up murderously against their old masters and seize the
property they had expected so receive.”27 These binary rumors reveal two important
aspects of emancipation. The first is that citizenship, here evinced in land ownership, for
newly freedpeople existed directly in the context of armed enforcement. The second and
more unfortunate point is that white Mississippians reacted to any armed enforcement of
African-American rights (whether by state militia units or paramilitary companies) with
hysteria and paranoia.
In Mississippi, debates over the alleged Christmas insurrections of 1865
specifically targeted the concept of black militias. As early as October, Mississippi’s
provisional governor William L. Sharkey wrote to the state’s Freedman’s Bureau
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commissioner to inform him of the rumored uprising, stressing that “the black troops are
relied on to carry out this measure” and that consequently “it is hoped the black troops
will be speedily removed from the country.”28 Sharkey’s response reveals that the fears of
insurrection in 1865 revolved around the increased military capability of black
Mississippians – a direct product of the Civil War. Thus, a pattern arose wherein whites
internalized unsubstantiated rumors of black uprisings, always in the context of armed
resistance, and produced violent backlash.
In late 1865, for the first time in what would become a notorious habit, the specter
of an African-American insurrection caused the mustering of state militia units. Governor
Sharkey, with the approval of President Andrew Johnson, called for militia units
“composed, as before the war, solely of white men…to guard against the threat of
insurrection.”29 This white state militia, as those that would follow it later in the century,
proved far more effective at disrupting than ensuring peace in the state. Federal
investigations into several state militias’ conduct in the South revealed that “militia
companies and armed regulators targeted freedpeople’s property as well as their persons
– breaking into cabins, rifling through trunks, and stealing arms, money, and other
belongings.”30 Under Presidential Reconstruction, then, the state militia became an
aggressive arm of the state bent on the suppression of political and social rights for
African Americans in Mississippi.
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Like many aspects of Reconstruction, however, militias (both the state militia and
paramilitary organizations) transformed under Congressional Reconstruction. Between
1868 and 1875, the legality of the state militia both appealed to black Mississippians and
drove white Mississippians to increased paramilitarism. The Union League stands at the
head of this transition. According to historian Michael W. Fitzgerald, the Union League
witnessed “explosive growth” in 1867 “as soon as Congress passed the Reconstruction
Acts.”31 What began as an organization to drum up Northern support for the war became
a secret one through which African Americans gathered to discuss and often practice
politics. Unfortunately, during Reconstruction, armed resistance became a necessary part
of such conversations. Fitzgerald argues that even before the uprising of the Ku Klux
Klan in 1868, “Leaguers drilled in unofficial militias.”32 The Union League consequently
embodied the pairing of politics and arms inseparable from the political activism of
freedpeople.
However, as Radicals in Congress made violence riskier for whites in Mississippi,
they abandoned the official state militia for an unofficial one: the Ku Klux Klan.
Fitzgerald argues that “the Klan's growth in early 1868 had complex causes, but
counteracting the Union League was one of its major political goals.”33 The Klan’s
methods reveal a distinct desire to avoid federal detection and intervention. By enacting
terror at night and covering themselves in regalia, its members could avoid identification,
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detection, and, most importantly, retribution. Beginning such covert tactics in 1868, “the
Klan rapidly destroyed the Union League as an effective political organization.”34 By the
time the state legislature convened to work on the state’s new Reconstruction constitution
in 1868, both black and white Mississippians considered armed enforcement a practical
mechanism for enforcing the laws, and opposing paramilitary organizations stood in that
role. However, Republican legislators soon opened new, legal avenues for African
Americans to defend their lives and their rights.
While Republicans controlled the both the Presidency and Mississippi’s
governorship, to state that Republicans or African Americans exercised complete control,
or even majority control, over Reconstruction politics would be fallacious. Despite
Mississippians fear of uprising in 1865, Neil R. McMillen notes that during
Reconstruction, “There were a few black county supervisors, perhaps eight black sheriffs,
and a small number of black chancery and circuit clerks; but no freedman held a judicial
post above the level of justice of the peace.” Rather than an image of near-total black
political dominance which Democrats would present to the public, “blacks never
controlled either chamber of the state legislature.”35 Democratic fears stemmed more
from the fact that Republicans and African Americans had increasing power (or power at
all) rather than total power. However, Republicans made the most of their elected offices,
beginning with the rewriting of the state’s constitution.
Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 gave rise to increased public outrage rooted in
“standing army” rhetoric. The Constitution of 1868 made the governor “Commander in
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Chief” of the militia and gave him the exclusive “power to call forth the militia to execute
the laws, repel invasion, and to suppress riots and insurrections.”36 White Democrats
feared such concentrated power in the hands of a state escaping their control. To make
matters worse, “in November [1868], Grant won the presidency and on his first day in
office sent General Adelbert Ames to Mississippi to take over the administration of state
government.”37 With a staunchly Republican president, a new carpetbagger governor, and
an overwhelmingly black population, Mississippi’s Democrats saw their political
hegemony slipping away.
The Constitution of 1868, named for when it was originally written, did not,
however, get ratified until December of 1869 after Ames took control, paving the way for
Mississippi’s reentry into the Union in February 1870. While Republicans held many
state offices, the opposition to the new constitution and the difficulty in getting it ratified
by voters revealed an early pattern of Republican political effort grating against an
undercurrent of popular Democratic sentiment. Often such Democratic opposition
revealed only a fear of African American political activity rather than any justified legal
complaint. John Hope Franklin notes that arguments against Reconstruction Constitutions
across the south “were the tirades of a people less concerned with the quality of
government than with who exercised the powers of government.”38
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Despite opposition, the new constitution passed, and the centrality of the state
militia soon arose with the passage of a new Militia Law on July 21, 1870, further
incensing Mississippi’s white Democrats. The Militia Law listed in minute detail every
contingency related to the militia, including who could enlist, who was in charge, what
duties were reserved for whom, how the militia would be funded, and how much men
would be paid for their service. This strict description and layout of the militia, viewed in
context of the paramilitary battles of the late 1860s, reveals a deep desire to strictly define
legal and extralegal violence in the state, a line that had grown ever blurrier since
emancipation. The increased power of the governor under the new constitution
underscores the move toward clarifying what forces counted as state militia. Section 37
gave the governor “full power to order into active service the Militia force of the
State…to suppress riot, insurrection or to aid the civil officers in the execution of the
laws or on account of any sudden emergency not embraced in this clause.”39 This
reworded statement of the governor’s sole power over the militia particularly alarmed
Democrats. However, the clauses of both the Constitution of 1868 and the Militia Law of
1870 which permitted militia use “to suppress riot and insurrection” would come to
define the next two decades.
The open wording of the law (“any sudden emergency not embraced in this
clause”) and its direct implication that the Republican governor of the day, James Alcorn
(elected following Mississippi’s readmission to the Union and removal of Ames as
military governor), could legally employ the militia for any purpose outraged white
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Mississippians. Many saw it as an affront to their liberty. In willful ignorance of both the
recent Civil War and the perpetual violence in Mississippi, the Weekly Commercial
Herald of Vicksburg responded by calling the militia a “sedentary militia,” claiming that
“There is no state in the Union in which militia is required,” and finally that there was
“less necessity for it in the Southern states than in any other in the Union.”40 The use of
the term “sedentary militia” invokes the fear of a standing army ingrained in the
American experience, particularly that of the south after the occupation of the Civil War.
Andrew F. Lang notes that southerners were not the only ones distrustful of peacetime
militias, claiming that “African American soldiers, white northern moderates claimed,
embodied the alarming chaotic nature of a standing army.”41 However, while
Republicans in Mississippi by 1870 held control of the state capitol and a legislated
militia to reinforce it, white Democrats harbored resentment bent on violence, while
white northerners grew increasingly apathetic.
Mississippians in 1871 nonetheless clung to their extralegal paramilitary groups
for defense, but a riot in Meridian soon proved to the state’s Republicans that an
organized force would be required to ensure peace. By 1871, hostilities remained
between former Union League members and the Ku Klux Klan. In March of 1871, white
activist Daniel Price arrived in Meridian “and wrote back to his former League comrades
that conditions were better across the Mississippi line. Several hundred freedmen joined
him, deserting labor contracts in the process.”42 After a massive fire struck the city, racial
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animosities flared over who to blame. At the trial of suspected arsonists (all prominent
black leaders in the community) shooting broke out in the courthouse, soon devolving
into a large skirmish between local Union Leaguers and Ku Klux Klan members. The
outbreak killed an estimated thirty black Mississippians and the white judge of the trial.43
Union League members applied to Governor Alcorn for assistance specifically so “that
they might put a stop to Ku Klux outrages,” yet the governor “gave them no
satisfaction.”44 Despite the new constitution, paramilitary militias rather than state units
prevailed. Republican officeholders such as Alcorn, however, felt no immediate
insecurity and thus no need to formalize the relationship between violence and state law
in practice; however, as the 1870s wore on, the need became strikingly apparent.
Though Adelbert Ames originally came to Mississippi on President Grant’s
orders, he won Mississippi’s gubernatorial election in 1873 with strong Republican and
African American support, and he would need the full power of the law to wield the state
militia. Otis A. Singletary notes that immediately after Ames’s election in 1873, “The
tempo of violence increased throughout the state, and Negro militia forces were called
upon to play a more dominant role in political affairs.”45 Violent outbreaks occurred
throughout the state (always tied to politics), the most violent of which were in Vicksburg
and Clinton, while Yazoo City trailed close behind. While each of these instances
affected the political and social temper of the state, a state-sponsored militia only
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appeared at Clinton. Thus, a minute description of each instance is not here warranted,
yet some important details on the development of the black militia as a means of
preservation for the Republican Party may be drawn from each instance. 46
On July 4, 1863, General Ulysses S. Grant captured the city of Vicksburg in one
of his most illustrious achievements of the Civil War. On July 4, 1874, President of the
United States Ulysses S. Grant faced the decision to send federal troops back to
Vicksburg, where bloodshed yet again occurred. Lemann succinctly summarizes the
situation: “At a July 4 celebration held by Negro Republicans…a group of whites with
guns turned up and started shooting.”47 Rampant violence followed, driving many
African Americans from their homes to Jackson, where they implored Governor Ames
for assistance. Ames, however, “tried to get troops, but the President [refused].”48 The
election on August 5 consequently “brought a sweeping Democratic victory in
Vicksburg.”49
By petitioning Grant, Governor Ames revealed a deep uneasiness with wielding the
state militia and displayed a reservation contrary to Democratic newspapers’ portrayal of
him as a dangerous demagogue. Future Democratic violence and caricatures of Ames
would regularly ignore such obvious distaste for organizing a military force. Ames’s
reluctance consequently plagued both himself and Mississippi’s African Americans
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throughout his term, while still failing to prevent the violence he feared. Furthermore,
Grant’s refusal to intervene in Mississippi’s violent politics did not bode well for Ames
and the Republican Party, shifting the burden of providing militarized protection for
African Americans solely to the governor. Ames, with clear constitutional and
presidential authority, still refused to deploy African American militia. However, when
violence in Vicksburg only increased, militarized force became a much more attractive
option for keeping order.
In November 1874, members of Vicksburg’s municipal government, including circuit
clerk C.W. Cordoza, his successor A.W. Dorsey, chancery clerk George W. Davenport,
and sheriff Peter Crosby (also in charge of collecting taxes) faced charges of financial
and political corruption. As the New York Times put it, the officials were “defying the
laws of the State and prostituting their offices to their private ends.”50 Local whites then
violently removed them (physically and metaphorically) from office, causing the former
officeholders to flee to Jackson for sanctuary. White Democrats in Vicksburg thereby
rerouted their attack on the Republicans in the city by changing their rhetoric. They
established “Taxpayers’ Leagues” to imply that Republicans “had failed to take the
measures required by law for the protection of the people” and “grossly misused
taxpayers’ money.” 51 The changing of titles, however, stemmed not from a true
grievance over taxes, but out of a carefully planned avoidance of the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871 that might spark federal intervention. Years after, Ames highlighted the absence
of true financial grievance by reflecting that “there was no ‘corruption’ as the statistics

50
51

“The Vicksburg Troubles,” The New York Times, December 13, 1874, 1.
“The Vicksburg Troubles,” The New York Times, December 13, 1874, 1.
22

prove,” but that “even corruption could not justify the taking of human life.”52 As
Democratic violence became more complicated, Ames’s sense of control diminished
further, and his methods became more desperate.
By the time Vicksburg’s Republicans fell under siege in 1874, Ames had already
expressed his fear of mustering an African American militia, yet he also realized that as
“the state government commanded the respect of the colored race only, it must depend
for military support on colored troops.”53 However, control slipping, Ames decided that a
show of force might reduce the growing Democratic threat. Thus, Ames sent Peter
Crosby, who had fled Vicksburg to seek protection from the governor in Jackson, “back
to Vicksburg with instructions to assemble a posse comitatus – a temporary militia”
which “would surely be made up entirely of Negroes.”54 Though this does not constitute
the deployment of the state militia, it indicates the willingness, first evinced after
emancipation, of black Mississippians to protect themselves in militia units. The
Vicksburg militia further reveals that by late 1874 Ames began to see a civilian
militarized force as the only way to maintain Republican officeholders, believing that an
African American force would be the only one willing to sustain his party. Governor
Ames then struggled with the conundrum which would haunt the rest of his
administration: which citizens to call upon? Lemann asks, “if they were white troops,
would they agree to carry out his orders, and if they were black troops, would they do
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more harm than good in the aggregate if they wound up killing whites?”55 Vicksburg’s
results proved far from encouraging.
From the outset, “the blacks were poorly armed” and “seem to have intended no more
than a show of force and not, as whites would claim, an attack on the city.”56 The
importance of the black militia as a “show of force” summarizes what happened in
Vicksburg, and what would happen later in other regions of the state. The black “posse
comitatus” at Vicksburg intended to display Republican and African American political
courage and a resolve not to back down to white intimidation. When Crosby’s militia
arrived at Vicksburg, they decided not to fight, yet on their peaceful retreat a group of
armed whites from Vicksburg and the surrounding areas opened fire. The New York
Times “estimated that from fifty to one hundred Negroes were killed, and about thirty
more captured.”57 This quote accurately captures the irony of white paramilitarism.
While Democratic newspapers hurled insults at the unconstitutionality of a state militia in
“peacetime,” they simultaneously practiced the “capturing” of prisoners of war. Thus, the
first effort at organizing African American citizens to, symbolically or physically, combat
white Democratic violence failed. Ames did not, however, give up on the militia as an
viable show of force.
While indiscriminate violence against African Americans in Mississippi never
stopped in the immediate aftermath of Vicksburg, federal involvement momentarily
slowed it. A desperate Governor Ames convened an emergency legislature in December
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to once again petition President Grant for troops. This time, he was more successful.
Grant authorized the use of federal troops in Mississippi and Louisiana (where violence
against blacks and Republicans had also increased) while a committee investigated the
Vicksburg troubles.58 During this period of federal intervention, the paramilitary White
League and White Line organizations were far less active, particularly in the public eye.
William C. Harris has noted that “white-line sentiment emerged in inverse relationship to
the potential for federal intervention.”59 Democrats wanted to pour on as much pressure
through violence as possible, yet they realized that if the federal government examined
the situation too closely, then a much larger, more organized, and better funded military
force would reenter the state. The state militia was a far more manageable threat to the
Democratic mind than the United States Army. Though white paramilitary groups
claimed to be bravely and courageously fighting for their honor and rights, there is a stark
lack of confrontation when an equally well-equipped armed force arose to meet them.
Throughout 1875, political tensions in Mississippi only heightened. However, in
the months leading up to the November 5 election, Democratic political violence
increased to the point of leaving the state militia as the only preservative option left to
Republicans. On September 4, 1875, black Republicans scheduled a barbecue to boost
morale for the upcoming election and to allow politicians to speak in front of a crowd
estimated between 1,500 to 2,500 people.60 Lemann notes that “To see, or even to think
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about a Negro militia sent whites into a frenzy of anticipatory violence,” so one can
imagine the effect of seeing none other than “Oliver Cromwell,” who paraded at the head
of an all-black militia unit while he “wore a plumed hat and cavalry saber and sat astride
a horse trimmed in red, white, and blue ribbons.”61 The memory of Vicksburg, the
increasing proximity to the election, the presence of a militarized African American
force, and the weakening of federal intervention created an atmosphere at Clinton poised
for violence.
After the barbecue and parade, speakers took the stage. While such barbecues and
political rallies happened regularly, in an unusual move for a political rally of any kind in
Reconstruction Mississippi, it is clear by all accounts that “an invitation was extended to
all persons to attend” so that there could then “be a joint discussion.”62 Though there
were many times more African Americans and Republicans at Clinton on September 4,
there were, by invitation, a small group of white Democrats who would be allowed to
speak. However, the Raymond Gazette proposed in early August that:
whenever a Radical pow-wow is to be held, the nearest anti-Radical club appoint
a committee of ten discreet, intelligent, and reputable citizens…to attend as
representatives of the taxpayers of the neighborhood and the county and true
friends of the Negroes assembled; and that whenever the Radical speakers
proceed to mislead the negroes…that the committee stop them right then and
there and compel them to tell the truth or quit the stand.63
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The Democrats of Clinton who attended the rally complied. To make matters worse,
many in the crowd, both black and white, observed what Melinda Meek Hennessy
describes as “the customary Southern male habit of always carrying a pistol.”64
The first speaker, Democratic Judge Frank Johnston spoke for roughly an hour
without incident, yet when Republican speaker H. T. Fisher, a stand-in for Adelbert
Ames, began speaking, he was interrupted when within “about five minutes someone
called the speaker a liar.”65 The Raymond Gazette’s orders had been followed. Though no
one afterward could specifically identify who shouted at Fisher, tempers flared in the
crowd. Later accounts point to a group of white men on the outer edge of the crowd
sharing a bottle of whiskey (which was prohibited at the event) as the source of the
violence. Charles Caldwell, a former slave, blacksmith, senator, and well-respected
citizen in both the white and black communities, confronted the group of white men,
begging them not to disturb the gathering. Soon after, however, Caldwell claimed to have
personally seen Frank Thompson, a white man, fire the first shot. 66 Chaos ensued. Shots
rang out from both sides, while both whites and blacks fled the scene in fear. When the
smoke cleared on the day of the riot, “fatalities that day numbered three white men and at
least five blacks, two of whom were children.”67 The African Americans fled to the
countryside, while the whites sent for reinforcements from surrounding towns to continue
the fight.68
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While the violence at the barbecue was bad, incendiary newspaper coverage made
the fallout far worse. White Line paramilitary groups both from Mississippi and from
nearby Louisiana flooded into Hinds County and began indiscriminately terrorizing and
killing numerous African Americans, who fled en masse to Jackson to beg for Governor
Ames’s help. 69 Fearing the political consequences of a display of force this close to the
election, Ames petitioned President Grant for military support. This time, Grant refused.
The president infamously stated to Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont that “the whole
public are tired out with these annual, autumnal outbreaks in the South” and that “the
great majority are ready now to condemn any interference on the part of the
government.”70 Grant’s statement embodies the near total indifference of both the federal
government and white northerners to Mississippi’s increasingly frequent atrocities. Grant
thereby placed the power to preserve Mississippi’s Republicans and African Americans
once again in the sole hands of Governor Ames, who finally saw the militia as his last
hope.
Ames again encountered the problem that “no white Republicans could be found
who would form a militia to oppose members of their own race, and forming a black
militia was perilous in the extreme, calling forth the centuries-old and never entirely
absent fear of and uprising by the majority race.”71 However, left with few other options,
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Ames mustered units from those African Americans who had fled to Jackson from
Clinton. By late September, Ames revived a bill, passed the year before in the wake of
Vicksburg, that appropriated $60,000 for the organization of the state militia, making
$5,000 immediately available to outfit two regiments. However, Democrats in the
legislature immediately passed a motion to prevent Ames from capitalizing on the
funds.72 Despite this, Ames wrote to his wife Blanche Butler Ames on September 23 that
he had “begun to organize colored militia” and, on September 27, that he “had a thousand
muskets arrive.”73 Abandoned by the federal government and distrustful of his own state
legislature, Ames finally asserted his right as governor to wield the militia.
African American attitudes toward the militia should have reassured Ames in his
actions. Many African Americans expressed far fewer apprehensions to joining the
militia than Governor Ames had in enlisting them. Abraham Burriss, a young African
American man, expressed a willingness to join the militia, asking Ames only for
weapons. Burriss noted that “we are all have sign our name to the malitia role, and only o
wante armes…give us guns and we will show the scondrels that the colored people will
fight.”74 Black Mississippians proved in the immediate aftermath of emancipation and
within the Union League that they were willing to bear arms to protect themselves and
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their rights within extralegal militia companies, so the attraction to a legal militia is
unsurprising. However, participating in the state-sanctioned militia required the hard to
win permission of Governor Ames.
After Ames’s militia appropriations bill, African American militia units became
“all the talk” in the state, while exaggerated white fears of a militant, overwhelming black
force grew worse than ever. 75 However, despite the reassurance of men like Abraham
Burriss that African Americans would fight, Ames wrote his wife Blanche Butler Ames
on October 4 that he was “convinced that my Negro militia has not the courage or nerve whatever it may be called - to act the part of soldiers.”76 Regardless, Governor Ames
finally mobilized a militia unit on October 9. Charles Caldwell, a leading figure of the
Clinton Riot, marched thirty-two miles to nearby Edwards Station leading two companies
of 190 men to deliver guns. The militia units, in full military dress, marched to Edwards
Station and back to Jackson undisturbed.77 Though it delivered arms, the militia that
traveled to Edwards Station predictably served a largely symbolic purpose. By mustering
and then using the militia, Ames proved that he was willing to manifest whites’ worst
fear, the African American militia, to preserve peace, political equality, and his own
office. Furthermore, the militia’s symbolism extended in that, while prepared to, it did no
fighting. Whenever an armed African American militia prepared for a fair fight,
paramilitary White Line groups again stood down. As Blanche Ames aptly predicted

“The Militia,” The Weekly Mississippi Pilot, October 9, 1875, 1.
Letter from Adelbert Ames to Blanche Butler Ames, October 4, 1875,
Chronicles from the Nineteenth Century, 205-6.
77
“Arrival of Capt. Caldwell’s Militia,” The Weekly Mississippi Pilot, October
16, 1875, 3.
22
75
76

earlier in September, “Bullies are always cowards when approached with courage and
determination.”78
Though White Line groups did not attack Caldwell’s militia, the symbol of armed
black men in military uniform outraged Democrats, who took to the papers to vent their
fears and stoke public anger toward the black companies. One prevalent aspect of the
coverage was the portrayal of Charles Caldwell, who, though lauded in many earlier
papers from both parties as the one trying to quell the unrest at Clinton, had by October
16 become, according to the Canton Mail, “one of the instigators of the riot.”79
Caldwell’s portrayal as an instigator rather than peacekeeper in the riot highlights both
the untrustworthiness of some Democratic newspaper coverage as well as an effort, to be
repeated in other riots, of undermining African American political organization by
highlighting criminality and riotousness amongst African American leaders.
Adelbert Ames also predictably came under fire. The Daily Mississippi Pilot
included an October 14 article entitled “Notes on and of the Sounding Preparations for
War” arguing that Ames’s actions were “violating the Constitution of the State and the
United States in raising, equipping and maintaining a standing army in time of peace.”80
Democrats again attempted to undercut Ames by making him appear incompetent,
although Ames’s mustering of the militia was within the realms of his power as granted
by Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868. Furthermore, Ames was “ordered to assemble it by
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the president of the United States.”81 If anything, the decision to utilize the militia in
1875, when he had permission since the previous year, could be read as charitable rather
than dictatorial.
The successful march to Edwards Station signaled one of the only active
movements the militia made under Governor Ames. However, after the success of the
Edwards Station march, rumors abounded that Ames would use the militia again to
reinstate the displaced sheriff of Yazoo City, A. T. Morgan, who had been deposed by a
white mob a few weeks prior. However, on October 13, 1875, a peace conference was
held between Ames and leading Democrats, arbitrated by a New Yorker named George
K. Chase. Both parties agreed that “Ames would promise not to send Charles Caldwell,
Albert Morgan, and the Negro militia to Yazoo City…and the white citizens would
promise to ensure that the quickly approaching election be free and fair.”82 Ames, hoping
to avoid more bloodshed, possibly thought that his show of force succeeded and would
no longer be needed for African Americans to politically sustain the Republican Party in
Jackson. However, a later congressional report aptly concluded that “The stipulation on
the part of the governor was faithfully kept, but the promise made by General George was
systematically disregarded by the democrats in the larger portion of the State.”83
As soon as word of the conference got out, The Clarion Ledger on October 20
stated that Morgan “has declined to avail himself of the escort of negro militia into Yazoo
County,” but that if the militia had been mustered, “The invasion of Yazoo county by a
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lawless pretended militia, armed to the teeth, would be such a trespass as will justify the
citizens of the county in repelling for the protection of their lives, their property, and their
sacred altars.”84 The Edwards Station and Yazoo incidents display a tendency of the
Democratic and White Line organizations to only commit violence when an organized
oppositional force cannot be found. Consequently, when Ames agreed to disband the
militia, that paved the way for the loosely veiled threat of violence underpinning the
Clarion Ledger’s statement.
Violence by no means ceased after the peace conference, and whites no longer
feared the armed opposition. Eruptions of particularly bad violence occurred in places
like Friars Point, Mississippi and Port Gibson, Mississippi, or as Leman generalizes “in
the parts of Mississippi that had the heaviest black population majorities.”85 Therefore,
Democratic suppression of Republican, and therefore black, votes continued unabated,
while Ames’s state militia, up to that point the only instrument left by which the
Republicans could attempt to maintain power, was nowhere to be seen.
With the threats of both federal intervention and the state militia out of the way,
the Democrats swept the elections of November 5. Eric Foner explains, however, that
“blacks remained steadfast; indeed, in some plantation counties, the Republican vote
actually increased. But where violence had devastated the [Republican] party’s
infrastructure and blacks ‘feared for their lives’ if they presented themselves at the polls,
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the returns constituted a political revolution.”86 Consequently, as Singletary puts it, “The
election of 1875, which marked the return to power of the Democrats in Mississippi,
marked the end of Negro militia in that state.”87 The new Democratic Governor John
Stone would not need to employ militia units.
While Adelbert Ames sought to preserve the ever-tenuous Republican hold on
politics in Reconstruction Mississippi with state militia, his efforts at organizing and
utilizing those predominantly black militia units failed to prevent Democratic takeover. In
discussing federal occupation of the South during Reconstruction, William H. Emory
noted in 1877 that “the presence of troops has not preserved the Republican party.”88
State militias likewise failed. However, the militia and the decision on whether or not to
use it was certainly not the only reason for the Republicans’ losses at the polls, as
William Bland Whitley notes that there was much division, conflicting interests, and
infighting within the party.89 However, the use of militia by Ames and the attitudes of
citizens toward it reveal important characteristics of and changes to the state of
Mississippi as it progressed into the late nineteenth century.
First, the militia’s importance to the governor increased. During Reconstruction,
Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868 and its later Militia Law of 1870 gave the governor
authority to use the militia at his bidding. Though Ames failed to sustain Republican
politics in the state by using the militia, the very attempt created a shift in how the
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governor could operate in the future and expanded both the executive and military arms
of the state. While white citizens of Mississippi came to view the militia unfavorably, in
the next decade the Democratic Party would manipulate the powers given to Governor
Ames, but for the oppression rather than protection of African Americans. In another
irony of Mississippi’s Reconstruction, later Democrats owed the Republican engineered
Constitution of 1868 for the militia power they would eventually wield.
At the citizen level, white and black Mississippians alike focused heavily on the
militia in the turmoil of the mid-1870s. White Mississippians, still reeling from the
occupation of the Civil War, grew to hate the state militia even more when Governor
Ames mustered predominantly African American units in 1875. White citizens thought of
black militias as “a presence galling during the war, and even more infuriating during
peace.”90 After the creation of black militia units following the Vicksburg and Clinton
riots, the newly reinstated Democratic majority would shy away from citizen soldiering
in the future, associating the state militia, white or black, with an unconstitutional
standing army.
To further complicate the narrative, several white Mississippi natives also joined
Ames’s state militia. By September 25, 1875, after the legislature approved the Militia
Appropriations Bill, the staunchly Republican Weekly Mississippi Pilot noted that
“seventy-one white citizens were enrolled, and sixty-three of that number were at once
mustered into service with the usual forms.”91 These whites could potentially have been
Democrats enrolling to thwart the creation of a black-dominated militia force, but it is
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unlikely, as whites had military forces of their own. Furthermore, John Hope Franklin, in
his seminal work on Reconstruction, notes that “whites were used…not merely as
officers but as enlisted men when they could be trusted and could be induced to join in
the task of supporting and protecting the Radical governments.”92 Thus, a portion of
Mississippi’s whites opposed Democratic violence enough to enlist in the state militia,
though they would in practice serve little purpose.
African Americans in Reconstruction viewed both state and informal militias as
legitimate means to protect themselves and enforce their newly won rights. The political
nature of the state militia here is important. As the militia attempted to maintain
Republican Party control in the state capitol, it also provided a driving force for political
activism within the African American community. The African American militia
movement in Reconstruction, particularly in Mississippi, was a way that African
Americans could legally protect their rights and “fill critical voids left by an increasingly
ambivalent and hamstrung United States Army in the wake of Military Reconstruction.”93
As Republicans in the North and in the federal government grew jaded with the violence
of the south, black southerners turned to the militia as the only legitimate way to protect
themselves against lawless white violence. When the Democratic Party swept the 1875
elections, African Americans’ dreams of ensuring their rights through the state militia
were likewise swept away.
The events in Mississippi in 1875 show that had black militiamen been able to
perform the duties they so desired, they might have successfully warded off much of the
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political intimidation they faced. Wherever armed and ready militia units appeared, white
paramilitary groups disappeared. African Americans, as shown above in Abraham
Burriss’s letter, were willing and ready to fight. Singletary blames Ames for his reticence,
asserting that “No one can say what the results might have been if Ames had been willing
to use, rather than merely organize, his Negro troops…The governor should never have
organized them unless he intended to put them to use, because from the moment
mobilization began, they became targets for a well-armed enemy.”94 Black people in
Mississippi stood ready to defend themselves, yet in contrast to white paramilitary
groups, they relied on the legal sanction of the governor as well as the arms the state
could provide.
Governor Ames’s position cannot be taken lightly. While it is easy to blame him,
one must also consider the precariousness of his position. The threat of a race war, or
even a second civil war, never quite left the south. Ames noted only three days after the
Clinton Riot that “in '60 and '61 there were not such unity and such preparation against
the government of the U. S. as now exist against the colored men and the government
their votes have established.”95 However, Ames had the backing of the federal
government in using the militia. A congressional committee, led by Senator George
Boutwell, later investigated the violence concerning the Mississippi election of 1875 and
whether a fair election was conducted. In the report, the committee noted that "it was the
duty of the governor to use the militia for the suppression of such riots as those of
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Vicksburgh and Clinton, and this without regard to the question whether the white or the
black race was most responsible therefor."96 Though Ames had full permission from the
federal government to employ the state militia, he chose timid displays to avoid further
violence which could have easily reached the governor’s mansion. Interestingly, Ames’s
conduct also mimicked that of other Reconstruction Governors in the south. John Hope
Franklin notes that "In Florida a militia was organized and armed in June 1868, although
it was never used. Governor Brownlow of Tennessee also organized a militia that served
more as a warning to his enemies than as an actual fighting force."97 Ames’s application
of the state militia as a threat rather than a fighting force thereby ignored the failures of
other governors who tried the same tactics years before. However, the threat of reigniting
the Civil War alone cannot explain Ames’s failure to learn from his contemporaries.
Governor Ames’s failure to effectively utilize the state militia also stemmed from
a less studied cause. Aside from his reluctance to start a race war, Ames gradually shifted
toward personal racism as violence increased and the election approached. Ames’s letters
to Blanche reveal the shift toward blatant, unjustified racism. While on September 23, he
noted that he would “continue till the last man of our side is in the ranks,” by October 4
he was “convinced that my Negro militia has not the courage or nerve - whatever it may
be called - to act the part of soldiers.” 98 In eleven days, and without having tested a
single unit, pressure caused Ames to turn against the African Americans who were ready
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to fight for themselves. Less than two weeks later, Ames shifted further toward blaming
the African Americans for being killed without being allowed, by Ames himself, to
legally defend themselves. The governor noted on October 12 after the successful march
to Edwards Station that “it is [African Americans’] fault (not mine, personally) that this
fate is before them. They refused to prepare for war when in time of peace, when they
could have done so. Now it is too late.”99 Therefore, a growing racism and resentment
toward the African Americans looking for protection hindered the mobilization of the
state militia as much as Ames’s own apprehension to use force.
His subtle shift toward racism made the decision to resign even easier when “in
February [1876], a legislative committee produced a thirteen-count bill of impeachment
against Ames.”100 Ames had fought constantly against violence and suppression in
Mississippi, yet he was left with only impeachment to show for it. In one last bid to
preserve his reputation for a potential future in the Senate, “on March 28, he made a deal
with the Mississippi legislature: he would resign as governor if the impeachment charges
against him were dropped.”101 Ames tired of fighting for a cause which both wearied him
and produced little meaningful impact, finally gave up. While political maneuvering
offers one explanation for his resignation, his frustration with the affairs of Mississippi
and his failing faith in the African Americans therein can hardly be discounted as
influential to his decision.
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While in office, though, Ames established a pattern of state militia usage which
would endure. During Reconstruction, legislation and necessity placed the state militia at
the center of focus in Mississippi. Ames’s use of the militia, particularly in mustering allblack units, created an apprehension toward the militia as the Democrats retook power.
As a new decade approached, however, the militia would again be used as a symbol in
Mississippi to “suppress riots and insurrections” for which events at Meridian,
Vicksburg, and Clinton proved a need. Similarly, white militias would, in practice,
almost never do any real fighting. As Ames had attempted to use the militia to preserve
Republican political power in Mississippi, Democratic Governor Robert Lowry would do
the same when challenges to his control arose. As the state moved forward into the
1880s, the state militia’s constituency and goals reversed, while its core practices
remained the same.
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Chapter II
In 1880, a census enumerator listed thirty-five-year-old Oliver Cromwell as an
illiterate farmer in Wilkinson County, Mississippi, married to Tennessee Cromwell.102
Despite his illiteracy, by the late 1880s Cromwell politically organized other African
American farmers in the Mississippi Delta, achieving enough success to spark a
bloodbath known as the Leflore County Massacre. While Cromwell was not the primary
instigator of the Clinton Riot of 1875, he stood at the forefront of the Leflore County
Massacre of 1889, pitting him against Mississippi’s state militia (of which he was once a
part) and leading ultimately to his exile. Cromwell’s experience, as explored in the last
chapter, continued to embody the changing racial, economic, and political status of
African Americans in Mississippi while highlighting the reinvented goals of the state
militia.
After the violent so-called “Redemption” of Mississippi in 1875, the state militia
dwindled in importance compared to its primary role in Reconstruction. Beginning
January 26, 1876, the state legislature repealed Adelbert Ames’s amendments to the
Militia Law of 1870 that had appropriated funds to the militia and mustered it into
companies.103 The Constitution of 1868 maintained the state militia as an organization,
yet this new act stripped it of the resources that would make it useful. To further prevent
a militia revival, on February 24, 1876, the legislature amended the Militia Law of 1870
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to reduce “The pay of the militia when in active service” to “five cents per day, for
officers and soldiers.”104 These acts dramatically underfunded the state militia to make it
unappealing to citizens who might join, deplete its resources if mustered, and limit a form
of political patronage to keep the poorest Mississippians from exercising leadership in the
militia.
Democratic Governor John M. Stone publicly upheld Mississippi’s abandonment
of the state militia only a year later. In Kemper County, Mississippi in 1877, Democratic
leader John Gully was murdered. While a black man was arrested for the crime,
Republican rival W. W. Chisolm was imprisoned for alleged conspiracy. After Chisolm’s
arrest, a mob of armed men arrived at the jail seeking vigilante justice. Chisolm’s
supporters soon arrived with arms of their own, and the ensuing battle left six dead. 105 As
historian Stephen Cresswell explains, Chisolm’s widow applied to Governor Stone for
militia assistance to quell the violence, but Stone, recognizing that sending in the militia
might reveal insecurity in the Democratic Party, refused.106 The importance of this
bloody incident lies in Governor Stone’s direct refusal to mobilize the state militia.
Sending in the militia would have revealed that political tension in Mississippi remained
strong enough to justify force. By ignoring the incident, Stone minimalized the
Republican sentiment that led to the bloodshed, and reassured Mississippians that the
state militia of Reconstruction would no longer be a threat. If any white Democrats
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needed further reassurance, they would receive it from the federal government the next
year.
In 1878, the federal government revealed its own growing apprehension toward
military involvement in individual states by passing the Posse Comitatus Act. Historian
Andrew Lang explains that “the act prohibited the army from enforcing the law and
regulating civil affairs unless approved by the US Constitution or prescribed by an act of
Congress. State militias…would instead assume these responsibilities.”107 Mississippi
thereby received the permission to handle its affairs as it pleased, unbothered by the
threat of federal intervention. The weight of peacekeeping rested on the state militia, but
the legislature had already successfully dismantled it.
Although the Posse Comitatus Act on the federal level made the state militia the
sole body of enforcement for all the states, Mississippi’s legislators chose to keep theirs
weak. There are a few reasons explain the decision to effectively dismantle the state
militia. The first explanation is financial. Historian Dorothy Pratt notes that following
Reconstruction, Mississippi’s state officials focused primarily on the state’s finances.108
Indebtedness plagued Mississippi for a variety of reasons after the Civil War and
Reconstruction, so the militia, a subliminal, as-needed force to begin with, was an easy
target for slashed funding. However, racial power dynamics and the experience of
Reconstruction contributed to the ease with which state leaders could dispense with the
militia.
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Furthermore, in the middle and late 1860s, whites created their own paramilitary
militias. Cresswell notes that “white military or paramilitary action to put down so-called
race riots…served notice on the black community that proud and independent behavior
would not be tolerated.”109 White Mississippians recognized their ability to form
paramilitary groups without fear of legal ramifications. They therefore preferred those
organizations to the state militia because they could reserve them exclusively to whites,
whereas the law prevented direct exclusion of African Americans from the state militia.
For example, one Mississippian captured the common nineteenth-century portrayal of the
Ku Klux Klan as “organized for the protection of the defenseless, the preservation of law
and order, and the traditions of the South,” a characterization that continued into the latetwentieth century.110 Beginning in the 1870s, then, paramilitary groups circumvented the
state militia, performing the same duties without fear of black participation. The
weakening of the state militia in the middle and late 1870s thereby reinforced the strength
of groups like the KKK and the white supremacy they were founded upon.
Though confident enough to neglect the state militia, the Democratic Party could
never be entirely comfortable with their success. As in Reconstruction, Redemption
politics were not black and white. While the Democratic Party wielded large influence in
state politics, the Redemption era was “a contentious time when Republicans continued
to share power and a variety of political parties challenged the Bourbons…for control of

109

Cresswell, Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race, 61.
Florence Warfield Sillers, Bolivar County, Mississippi: Its Creation, Pioneer
Days and Progress in the Heart of Mississippi Delta, (Spartanburg, South Carolina,
Reprint Company, 1976), 168. Quoted in Pratt, Sowing the Wind, 15.
51
110

state and local government.”111 The Democratic Party, though entirely white, failed to
monopolize the white vote in the 1880s. Historian C. Vann Woodward notes that despite
its name, “the organization and control of the party was anything but
democratic…everything was the private business of a few politicians known by the
discontented as the ‘ring’ or the ‘courthouse clique.’”112 Discontentment produced by the
hierarchical and elitist Democratic Party pushed marginal whites, particularly lowincome farmers, to cooperate with African Americans in Mississippi in a process known
as fusion or fusionism. Historian Edward Ayers notes that “The early 1880s witnessed
many attempts at cooperation and fusion among Republicans and independents.”113
While white Democrats mistrusted cooperation between Mississippi’s politically
disempowered in the late 1870s and early 1880s, such cooperation would spark a
renewed interest in the state militia by the middle of the decade.
Growing demographic changes produced further insecurities for the Democratic
Party. The African American population in Mississippi skyrocketed in the 1880s, giving
the Democratic Party further cause for concern. Ayers notes that “communities in
Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia watched as huge crowds of local blacks gathered at
railroad stations to await transportation to [jobs in] the Mississippi Delta, the Louisiana
rice or sugar fields, or the turpentine camps of the piney woods.”114 As the planter class
declined in the 1880s, and as the South industrialized, African Americans flooded to the
fertile soil of the Mississippi Delta and the burgeoning lumber industries of the Piney
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Woods to seek economic opportunities. This influx of African Americans into
Mississippi coincided with a loss of native whites. Though race might have contributed to
some whites’ departure, economic opportunities and the decreasing availability of land in
the south led many whites, who had the financial means to do so, to seek better fortunes
in the west. Ayers also notes that “while the thirteen Southern states saw a net loss of
537,000 blacks between 1880 and 1910, the loss of whites totaled 1,243,000 in those
same decades.”115 Specifically, counties in Mississippi experienced an average black
population growth of 91 percent in that same date range.116 Whites in Mississippi never
boasted a population majority, yet they were being even further outstripped in the 1880s.
Strict democratic process, then, did not favor the Democratic Party.
Many of the African Americans moving either to the south or to different regions
of the south did so for economic reasons, but they would not be politically silent when
they got there. Historian Omar H. Ali explains that in the mid-1880s, “African Americans
born in the decade before the Civil War who were old enough to have experienced the
promise of Emancipation and the collapse of Reconstruction began to create local
organizations in order to foster solidarity and economic cooperation within their
communities.”117 These men, like Oliver Cromwell, rose to prominence by emphasizing
the benefits of unity among rural African Americans in the south. These men openly
challenged the Democratic Party, despite the violence they faced. Ali states that
“southern African Americans in the post-Reconstruction era were not only actively
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organizing against (not simply victims of) Democratic rule but developed their own lines
of independent black political organizing.”118 Consequently, even if the Republican Party
in Mississippi lost much of its functionality with the Election of 1875, a trend toward
independent, third party organizing developed in its wake. In an ironic turn, then, African
Americans became more politically unified and autonomous after the antagonistic
Democratic Party recaptured the state capitol. Unfortunately, this autonomy predictably
sparked violent backlash from white Democrats.
The Election of 1881 in Mississippi offered the first resuscitation of a familiar
pattern of violence, politics, and race, starting the process by which the militia would
again rise to prominence. Ali notes that “the specter of 'Black Republicanism' had loomed
large in the consciousness of Mississippi Democrats throughout the summer and fall of
1881,” which manifested violently in the state election that November.119 Black and
white citizens of Meridian unified under fusion candidates in the months leading up to the
election, sowing seeds of anxiety within the Democratic community. Consequently, “a
sheriff’s posse in Meridian…gathered as a show of force to intimidate fusion voters,” but
they were “soon matched by the same number of African Americans who came to protect
fusion voters.”120 To white Democrats, this display of black solidarity and white political
support for it created an explosive atmosphere.
The Marion voting precinct, just north of Meridian, saw the bloodiest violence. The
Salt Lake Daily Herald from Salt Lake City, Utah, maintained that at the Marion voting
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precinct on November 8, 1881, a white man named Joseph Barrett was insulted by an
African American man. Barrett then turned to strike him with a cane, but “before he
could strike, another negro, Frank Johnson, shot him in the neck.”121 Violence erupted at
the precinct, leaving five white men dead. The sheriff then assembled and mobilized “a
posse of seventy-five” men to the area, an alleged twenty of whom were dispatched to the
home of Edward Vance, who was “said to have given the order to the negroes to begin
firing.”122 Accounts differ sharply on what happened next, but regardless, when the
smoke cleared five white men lay dead, several of the posse, including the sheriff, were
injured along with “four or five” African Americans. According to his wife Julia, Edward
Vance escaped, yet one of his sons, John Vance, was killed and another, William Vance,
was arrested.123 Ali notes that “the number of African American casualties went
unreported.”124
The Marion Riot, though largely debated and contradictory in narrative, revealed
some overarching changes and insecurities in Mississippi. First, the number of African
Americans who, according to any account, participated in the shooting at Marion was
significantly lower than the band of between 75 and 100 men who constituted the
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sheriff’s posse. However, contemporary accounts persistently called the event a “race
riot” with connotations that a collective force, rather than a handful of men, intentionally
provoked the disturbance. This revived the white Democratic habit of labelling any black
political or physical resistance as a “riot” to justify overcompensated violent opposition.
The Chicago Tribune noted with bitter sarcasm that African Americans’ only guilt rested
in the fact that they “forgot their constitutional timidity and had the manhood to resent
[whites’] insults.”125 While this instance did not invoke the “to suppress riots and
insurrections” clause of Mississippi’s Constitution of 1868, it served as a reminder to the
Democracy that riots, as they imagined them, could and would still occur. As the
Meridian Riot of a decade before had proven, binary extralegal militias again ruled state
politics in Mississippi.
Another important feature of the Marion Riot of 1881 was its emphasis on and
denunciation of fusion politics. The Salt Lake Daily Herald concluded its coverage of the
event by explaining that “the fusionists’ doctrine for negroes to carry pistols to the polls
was the cause of the disturbance.”126 The Daily Memphis Avalanche made a similar
statement, mentioning furthermore that “three kegs of powder and a large supply of
buckshot was found in Vance’s house” after the riot.127 By highlighting the fusionist
aspect of the riot, these newspapers undergirded already present fears about rising
African American political power in the state and discouraged other potential fusionists
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from participating in what was labeled an underhanded practice. The idea that
Redemption had secured political hegemony for white Democrats faltered before the
sheer numbers from which coalitions between African Americans and independent whites
could draw. Early in the 1880s, then, the Marion Riot both revealed the presence of
fusionists and offered an opportunity to quell cooperative sentiment among whites on the
fence.
By mid-decade, the state militia began to restrengthen itself in correlation to
growing black political organization. In 1885, The Clarion out of Jackson, Mississippi
published a report by the Adjutant General of Mississippi with a full listing of the state’s
twenty known militia units, their officers, and the realization that “many of these
companies are not in active state of organization” and that “there may be other new ones
that are not included in the list.”128 The militia, dormant since 1876, began the journey
back to prominence. The Clarion’s listing signified a renewed interest in the state of the
militia and its capabilities if needed, along with an implicit call for any unofficial militias
or white paramilitary groups (“new ones”) to become official. However, while the militia
regained its footing, further turmoil in the state revealed that Democrats were not yet
ready to deploy it.
Violations of the delicate, poorly defined or understood intersections of race,
labor, and politics continued to produce bloodshed in Mississippi, and black political
organizing coincided with another so-called “riot” on March 16, 1886. The affair began
with spilled molasses and ended with over ten dead. Ed and Charley Brown, two African
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American brothers, spilled molasses on a white man named Robert Moore. Moore’s
friend, a white lawyer named James Liddell, sought retribution. What started as a verbal
argument ended when “gunfire erupted which left both Liddell and both Browns
injured.”129 The Browns took Liddell to trial for attempted murder, an act of legal
participation which shocked the white community. The day of the trial, March 16, “a
group of 40 or 50 white men, armed with carbines and revolvers, rode up to the Court
House” and “opened fire on the negroes…Ten negroes were killed and three others
mortally wounded.”130 While this senseless violence even outraged many whites,
Mississippi Governor Robert Lowry stated that “The riot was provoked and perpetrated
by the outrage and conduct of the Negroes.”131 Thus another outbreak of violence
occurred when African Americans asserted their rights, here the right to charge a white
man in court. Importantly, Governor Lowry’s proximity to the event caused him to
grapple with the issue of violent race relations and the way that the state should deal with
such instances. His response unsurprisingly places full blame on the African American
men, as it unfailingly would in the future. While the militia was not called out in this
case, the Carroll County Massacre pushed Lowry to organize a force capable of
suppressing riots and insurrections in an increasingly turbulent state.
Two months after the Carroll County Massacre, Governor Lowry established
“Camp Lowry” in Vicksburg, where militia training occurred over five days.132 Less than
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one month after that, Mississippi Adjutant General William Henry issued General Order
Number 4, which “ordered that all military Companies, now organized, shall be enlisted
and mustered into the service of the State at as early a date as practicable,” while listing
several more measures for the Adjutant General to keep a record of the state militia’s
manpower and consequent capability. 133 The Carroll County Massacre thereby
accelerated the process of reforming the state militia into a functional force, as the need
to suppress riots and insurrections became increasingly obvious to governor Lowry.
Mississippi’s renewed interest in the state militia occurred in the context of
developments throughout the entire New South. As the works of Ayers and Woodward
have noted, the New South experienced some economic growth and modernization in the
late nineteenth century through the combined efforts of southern politicians and northern
investors.134 However, industrial growth and labor often contradicted the deeply
ingrained agrarianism and labor relationships of southern states. Ayers furthermore
argues that southerners had cheap and easy access to weapons, and “when politics and
economic turmoil constantly threw people into conflict, such weaponry and violence
could easily spark interracial bloodshed.”135 While Democratic interest in the state militia
reflected growing party insecurity, it also underscored the trend of modernization and
industry in the late nineteenth century to upset social codes and produce widespread
interest in state-sanctioned enforcement.
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Local and national political events only increased Democratic Party paranoia as
the 1880s wore on. As the Carroll County Massacre ended, the Black Populist Movement
“took organizational form in 1886 with the creation of various mutual-aid societies and
labor unions.”136 Though not yet a political organization, the growth of Black Populism
united disadvantaged farmers in the Mississippi Delta of both races. On a federal level,
McMillen summarizes that “in 1888, for the first time since 1872, the Republican party
won control of the presidency and both houses of Congress.”137 The Republicans utterly
defeated the Democrats on the federal level, and southern states like Mississippi
continued to face fusion between African Americans and poor white farmers at home. By
1889, then, Governor Lowry, no longer inundated with the idea of Democratic
hegemony, sought a way to destroy the Republican Party in Mississippi, end fusionist
political activity, and secure the Democratic Party against federal threats. The Black
Populist Movement, headed by Oliver Cromwell, offered a perfect scapegoat.
The stage for the state militia’s resurrection became Leflore County. Events in
late August placed citizens of Leflore County on high alert and caught Governor Lowry’s
attention. On August 23, “Capt. S. H. Whitworth…was waylaid and murdered by a party
of unknown men near his home in Leflore County.”138 Governor Lowry personally
offered a $500 reward for the capture of the assassins, and, more importantly, urged “all
officers of this State to be diligent in their efforts to arrest said fugitive.”139 This incident
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reveals the tension in Leflore County on the heels of a publicized murder, giving citizens
a reason to be uneasy. By calling on the “officers of this State,” Lowry’s language also
shifted toward organized force as a means of restoring control which, with the right
spark, would translate easily into deploying state militia units.
Meanwhile, Oliver Cromwell promoted political and economic solidarity among
black and white farmers in the same area. By September of 1889, he was actively
“encouraging black farmers in the county to trade with a white Alliance cooperative store
some thirty miles away in Durant, Holmes County, instead of with local white shop
owners who were price gouging.”140 Cromwell not only organized black farmers into the
Colored Farmers’ Alliance, but he mobilized those farmers in fusionist solidarity with
white farmers of the similar, though all white, Southern Farmers’ Alliance. Democrats
reeled at the successful cooperation between the poor black and whites of Leflore
County, and Cromwell became an easy target for attempts to destroy the farmers’
traction.
While the Colored Farmers’ Alliance under Cromwell pursued primarily
economic goals, his methods resembled those of a politician. Cromwell not only
organized black economic independence, “he also gave a strong example of personal
independence by occasionally delivering bold speeches to rally support for his cause.”141
Cromwell consequently embodied the fears of white planters in the Mississippi Delta
economically and ideologically. Cromwell’s speeches spelled danger if they bridged the
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short gap between the economic and political. The planters responded swiftly. In late
August, Cromwell received, “a letter signed anonymously with crossbones, skeleton, etc.
ordering him to quit his work and leave the country, giving him ten days.”142 Cromwell,
an experienced soldier, stood his ground, as did the African Americans who organized
under him. The Colored Farmers’ Alliance members of Leflore County met and that
“same evening the whites at Shell Mound [Mississippi] received a threatening letter from
parties of negroes who signed themselves ‘Three Thousand Armed Men.’”143
The ancient fears of an armed Black uprising dovetailed with exaggerated –
almost hysterical – rumors about the size of the Black force to color white perceptions of
events in Leflore County. Though the letter implied a force of three thousand men, The
Daily Commercial Herald ironically estimated the next day that “there has never by
actual count been more than two hundred negroes at Minter City [Leflore County], and
they were not disposed to be aggressive” continuing that even if more people had been
gathered, it was likely “more for the purpose of self-protection than anything else.”144
Regardless of the actual number, the idea of a large body of armed African Americans,
whether 200 or 3,000, terrified the white community and brought Governor Robert
Lowry personally to Leflore County accompanied by three units of the state militia.
Lowry’s involvement in Leflore County highlights the political nature of calling
out the state militia. Rather than order out militia units that were already close to the site
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of the alleged uprising, Lowry personally caught a train and “went up Sunday to
Greenwood, ordered out the Capitol Light Guards and other troops belonging to the
militia,” including three companies “organized at Yazoo City, Grenada, Carrollton, and
Greenwood.”145 Lowry’s march alongside the militia proposed to show bravery and
courage in meeting a riotous force. The politics of the event may also be seen in that
Lowry and two other public officials “made speeches from the hotel veranda, in which
moderation was counselled, and the advice given to arrest the ring leaders and let the law
take its course.” The speeches were reported to have “had a fine effect and served to quiet
the people in some measure.”146 Mobilizing the militia and giving speeches upon its
arrival served a symbolic purpose by reassuring whites that the state militia still existed to
“suppress riots and insurrections,” though for opposite purposes than the Reconstruction
militia. Lowry successfully made his point, and the brief scare of insurrection seemed to
be effectively suppressed. However, when Lowry left Leflore County, the militia stayed.
After Lowry’s departure, “part of the men were detailed to go in different
directions and make a thorough search of the entire surrounding country in order to
discover [the African Americans’] whereabouts.”147 Here, accounts become hazy, yet
many records indicate that horrible violence occurred to different degrees after the
governor returned to Jackson. While newspapers recorded violence from ambiguous foes,

“The Trouble in Leflore County,” The Yazoo Herald (Yazoo City,
Mississippi), September 6, 1889, pp. 2; “No Bloodshed,” The Daily Commercial Herald
(Vicksburg, Mississippi), September 3, 1889, 1.
146
“No Bloodshed,” The Daily Commercial Herald (Vicksburg, Mississippi),
September 3, 1889, 1.
147
“The Trouble in Leflore County,” The Yazoo Herald (Yazoo City,
Mississippi), September 6, 1889, 2.
51
145

one reporter specifically noted that “’African Americans were hunted down like dogs,’”
and that “one sixteen-year-old guardsman beat a child to death while his older brother
held the parents at bay with a gun.”148 This account contradicts other newspapers which
signified the militia’s removal alongside Governor Lowry, inculcating the state militia as
an instigator of, rather than means to prevent, unrest.
Newspapers around the country estimated the total dead anywhere from zero to
over one hundred people.149 However, historian William F. Holmes concludes that “it
seems – based on the sources consulted – that the whites killed about twenty-five
blacks.”150 Ten specific deaths can be determined by newspaper reports. One newspaper
as far away as Lancaster, Pennsylvania, reported specific names for eight of the dead:
“John Boyker, Dol Wharton, Monroe Jones, Scott Marsh, Warren Snell, Theyton Lock,
Ben. Lock, and Warren Beckworth.”151 By September 28, one of the chief organizers in
Leflore County, George Allen, reportedly “was hung in Leflore County for his
participation in the late disturbance there.”152 Specific references to those murdered
reveal that the combination of the state militia and volunteer paramilitary groups in
Leflore County did not stay in Leflore County “to suppress riots and insurrections.”
Instead, it used the language of a race riot to hunt down and murder African Americans
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and to assert Democratic hegemony where it seemed to be wavering. Finally, Wiley
Anderson, who lived through the spike of bloodshed in Leflore County, committed
suicide on September 28 for reasons that are not made clear but are implied stem from the
recent events there.153
Despite begin driven from Leflore County, Cromwell’s legend only grew in the
coming weeks. The Daily Commercial Herald stated that Cromwell passed through
Vicksburg as early as the night of September 2.154 Whether true or not, Cromwell was
never captured in Leflore County while the militia combed the area. As of September 6,
The Yazoo Herald reported that his “whereabouts at present are unknown, but there are
about 75 or 100 men searching the woods …”155 Regardless of exactly where Cromwell
disappeared to, the militia had accomplished the white planters’ and Democrats’ goal of
driving him from Leflore County, and breaking black political power. Cromwell’s
portrayal in newspaper accounts also indicates a trend in the overall construction of race
riots in the period. Cromwell was repeatedly referred to in newspaper renderings as an
“ex-convict,” to both undermine his political actions and imply lawlessness in African
American political groups. Though no paper specifically referenced what criminal
activity Cromwell held that title for, The Vicksburg Herald from August 7, 1875 stated
that “Oliver Cromwell was arrested for drunkenness in Houston, Texas,” and that “they
fined the old Ironsides, too.”156 This description not only provides an explanation for the
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repeated references to Cromwell as an ex-convict, it reveals that he was a notably public
figure, designated “old Ironsides,” even before the Clinton Riot.
The Clinton Riot of 1875 did, however, add to his budding renown, contributing
another layer to the descriptions of his presence in Leflore County in 1889. At least two
newspapers described Cromwell as both and ex-convict and a principle leader of the
Clinton Riot of 1875.157 The emphasis on Cromwell’s criminality couples with his
presence at Clinton to portray him as a repeatedly militant rioter, ignoring the far greater
number of African Americans who were murdered at both Clinton and Leflore County.
While certain papers described the events at Leflore County as a riot, and two
used the word insurrection, the event became known as the Leflore County Massacre.158
As opposed to Meridian, Clinton, Marion, and Carroll County, African Americans in
Leflore County never fired a shot. A threatened force of African Americans existed only
on paper as far as anyone could prove, yet Lowry chose this instance as the one befitting
state militia. By labeling the events at Leflore County an insurrection, the governor could
then mobilize the state militia with impunity under the Constitution of 1868 at a time
when a public, militant show of Democratic Party strength could resecure its hegemony.
Lowry’s act succeeded. White planters in the area who operated the Durant Commercial
Store, also members of the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, publicly denounced and
abandoned the Colored Farmers’ Alliance in the aftermath of Leflore County.159 Holmes
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notes that “with so many of the Colored Alliance leaders killed and driven away and with
so many of the remaining blacks terrorized, the Colored Alliance movement in Leflore
County collapsed.”160 The fusionism Democrats so feared was abandoned. If any rural
white farmers had begun to sympathize with black farmers through shared plight, Lowry
effectively redirected their attention back to racialized Democratic Party loyalty.
One of the most important results of the Leflore County Massacre was its
influence in pushing the state to its next, and current, constitution. The Clarion-Ledger of
November 21, 1889 printed verbatim the Constitution of 1868 under the title “The
Constitution of the State of Mississippi as it now Stands – Read it and Judge for Yourself
of its Shortcomings.” The Leflore County Massacre’s influence on this call to action
appears in that the piece begins with Article IX, the militia article.161 An effort to rewrite
the state constitution briefly arose in 1886, notably the same year as the Carroll County
Massacre, but it was shot down on the grounds that “an effort to limit negro suffrage
would bring evils upon the state in the way of adverse congressional legislation and
Federal administrative proceedings.’”162 Here again one may see the pattern where any
form of African American resistance, even self-defense, sparks an overcompensation of
white backlash. After the Leflore County Massacre, though, Mississippi’s Democrats
would be sufficiently concerned about their political future to legalize black
disenfranchisement.
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The state militia arose as an important point of contention between the delegates.
Some of the arguments over whether to keep the state militia stemmed from economic,
rather than racial, lines, yet those determined to keep the militia did so with the
assumption that it would be all white.163 However, arguments extended beyond a purely
racial sphere. While some argued that a state militia would be an effective use of state
funds, “McLaurin of Rankin County…opposed the idea of a ‘standing army’ and
indicated that ‘we only have the newspaper reports about the Greenwood affair cited by
gentlemen.’”164 The ideological aversion to organized troops which developed after the
Civil War evidently still haunted some of Mississippi’s delegates, as did the much more
recent Leflore County Massacre. Others, such as J. Z. George, favored a state militia
from personal experience with its usefulness. George was a ringleader in the Redemption
movement of 1875 and favored an organized militia because “‘in his own experience he
had known the necessity of suppressing racial disturbances.”165 All agreed that the militia
should be a white-only arm of the government. The debate around the militia then
revolved more specifically around the phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections” which
had inspired every instance of militia use since the phrase’s conception in 1868.
The delegates continued to argue for and against a specific militia clause based on
the racial component of a militia, how to fund it, and whether mob violence would not
serve as an apt substitute.166 In the end, the militia remained as a direct descendant of the
Constitution of 1868. The phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections,” lived on,
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sustaining the governor’s racial and political control mechanism.167 Though the wording
of the law does not prohibit African American participation, the disenfranchisement
brought on by the new constitution coupled with the violence of the preceding years
effectively excluded blacks in practice. The tie between securing white supremacy in the
south and the state militia appeared immediately after the Constitution of 1890. In a wave
of Confederate commemoration throughout the south, the Adjutant General of
Mississippi’s yearly report places the state militia in Richmond, Virginia at “the
unveiling of the statue of General Robert E. Lee, on May 29, 1890.”168
Governor Robert Lowry, then, resurrected the state militia to combat local
Republican and fusionist challenges and to preserve Mississippi as a place of white,
Democratic power. Lowry borrowed the formula directly from Adelbert Ames in 1875,
but two factors differentiate the two. First, Ames was reticent at Clinton, while Lowry
was decisive at Leflore County. The second distinguishing factor explains the first. Ames
necessarily composed his militia largely, though not entirely, of African American troops,
while Lowry commanded white ones. While race did not reflect the potential quality of
the troops, the racial component in both cases mediated the actions of each respective
governor. For example, Ames’s reticence can be understood as an effort to prevent a race
war or further violence, and he also had far fewer voluntary troops at his disposal and
lacked the support of his own legislature and the federal government. Boldness aside,
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Ames stood in an untenable and isolated position. Lowry, on the other hand, employed
white troops bent on going to Leflore County whether in the militia or independently,
easing the burden of recruitment. Lowry’s swift action and availability of zealous troops
in Leflore County then allowed him to make the state militia an arm of the state for
protecting white Democratic interests, manipulating the phrase “to suppress riots and
insurrections” exactly as Adelbert Ames had fourteen years before. The state militia
thereby stood at the nexus of change and continuity in Mississippi as Reconstruction died
and the Jim Crow era was born
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Conclusion
Oliver Cromwell’s experiences with the state militia offer a lens through which to study
the development of white supremacy in late nineteenth century Mississippi. The
Constitution of 1868 opened militia service to Black Mississippians and, in turn, allowed
them to defend their civil and political rights. Republican Governor Adelbert Ames
realized the usefulness of the state militia in preserving his and his party’s power in the
state, yet his mishandling of that militia “to suppress riots and insurrections” led to his
ruin. Though numerous Black Mississippians expressed a desire to fill the militia’s ranks,
the threat of a full-fledged race war, the growing precariousness of his own political
power, and a depleting personal belief in the militia’s effectiveness prevented Ames from
substantially deploying units. When Ames finally allowed the militia to muster, white
violence decreased, if only for a moment, revealing a pattern wherein legal, state-backed
military force intimidated paramilitary groups nearly every time they came in contact.
Nevertheless, Ames’s tentative commitment to the militia created a political and social
climate that diminished political opportunity for black Mississippians.
The fall of Reconstruction in Mississippi signaled the fall of the state militia for a
brief time. Paramilitary mob violence ruled as the primary body of enforcement in the
state until the mid-1880s, when fusion tickets threatened the Democratic Party’s
stranglehold on state politic. The combination of those trends sparked renewed interest in
the state militia as a functional arm of the state. By 1889, when Democratic Governor
Robert Lowry perceived a need to reinforce his party’s hegemony in Mississippi, he, like
Ames, chose the state militia to perform a symbolic show of force in Leflore County,
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Mississippi. However, though Democratic newspapers portrayed the militia as having
arrived at Leflore County and made their point quietly, they remained after the governor
left the county, becoming an active threat and resulting in the bloodshed of the Leflore
County Massacre of 1889. The Democratic Party’s militia-based success stifled black and
fusionist political activity in the state, causing the state’s legislators to preserve it in the
new Constitution of 1890. The state militia then, while its written and unwritten purposes
remained the same, transformed between 1865 and 1890 from a Republican tool for
preserving African-American rights to a Democratic weapon for ensuring black
disenfranchisement.
While many studies of the period and, more specifically, of the Clinton Riot of
1875 and Leflore County Massacre of 1889 diminish the militia’s role, the extensive
coverage that military companies received in newspapers suggest that they may have had
an outsized role in shaping popular perceptions of these events. The Meridian, Vicksburg,
and Clinton Riots of the 1870s sparked the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of
Redemption, and the state militia stood at the center of both events. Throughout the
1880s, as the underrepresented in Mississippi challenged the Democratic Party, the state
militia again became the primary response for meeting that challenge. Coverage of the
Leflore County Massacre likewise stressed first the need for, then the presence of, the
state militia, but with a very different make-up from the militia of the 1870s. Such
accounts prove that the state militia was central to Mississippian’s understanding of the
turmoil surrounding them.
The phrase “to suppress riots and insurrections,” found in both the 1868 and 1890
constitutions, remained the keystone for militia organization and deployment. The
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Clinton Riot of 1875 and the Leflore County Massacre of 1889 offer two key instances
when alleged rioting necessitated the militia. Both instances saw ex post facto militia
involvement. While Oliver Cromwell’s militia parade technically meant that militiamen
were present at Clinton, their presence was not state ordered. Governor Ames’s decision
to muster the militia after the riot was not only ineffective in suppressing violence, it
exacerbated racial tensions. Similarly, Governor Lowry sent the militia to Leflore County
after an alleged black uprising, but when Lowry arrived with the militia in tow, no
violence was to be found. Both parties then, deployed the militia under the “to suppress
riots and insurrections” clause as a response to political pressure instead of a proactive
arm of enforcement. The difference remained that the Democrat-heavy militia of 1889
perpetuated violence without (recorded) state sanction. Both parties keyed in on the same
phrase and manipulated the militia in the same general way.
While examining the state militia offers crucial insight into late-nineteenthcentury Mississippi, the narratives of both riots as written by contemporary sources speak
to modern issues of race, representation, and civilian force. Composed of ordinary
citizens, the state militia became an important institution for carving out individual rights
among Mississippians. After 1865, both Republicans and Democrats in Mississippi
sought paramilitary protection for their opposing political and social agendas through the
Union League and Ku Klux Klan. However, the fate of the state militia in the late
nineteenth century ultimately excluded African Americans from legal armed protection
while providing sanction to white paramilitarism. The importance of citizen soldiering
and citizen-based public enforcement may be seen in Mississippi’s state militia.,
highlighting how state institutions allegedly for the protection of all citizens can be
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manipulated to exclude and disarm certain populations. Regardless of the legislated
purpose of the militia, African Americans were first protected, then attacked by that
institution based on access to participation within it. For everyday citizens of both races,
then, Mississippi’s state militia in the late-nineteenth century became a present and
important method for determining who would have rights and how those rights would be
enforced.
The terms “riot” and “insurrection” used to muster the militia were almost entirely
exaggerated based on the facts of each instance to which they were applied. At Clinton,
Marion, Carroll County, and Leflore County, each respective white mob or militia far
outnumbered those of African Americans. Furthermore, only at Marion did an African
American incite violence by shooting (though accounts for Clinton and Carroll County
were contentious). While black Mississippians faced nearly constant threats from
extralegal mobs, Ayers notes that throughout the south, “when blacks did turn against
whites, they risked terrible retribution from other whites.”169 The relatively small
numbers of African Americans involved in the disputes could not justify the mass
murders of innocent civilians who were often nowhere near the scene of the incident. In
comparison, there are no recorded instances within this period of Mississippi’s history
where white mob violence, arguably more prevalent, was deemed insurrectionary or
riotous. These instances, then, offer comparisons to modern ones where media
representations depict African American protests as “riots” and stress criminality therein.

169

Ayers, The Promise of the New South, 155.
74

Individual representation also influenced the events of this study. Not only did the
phrase “riot” connote lawlessness broadly for African American political organizing,
individual descriptions of the events’ black participants augmented criminal rhetoric. For
example, Charles Caldwell at the Clinton Riot was originally described as a peacekeeper,
yet as black power grew through use of the state militia, newspapers retrospectively
called him an instigator.170 Ironically, in the aftermath of the Clinton Riot, it was African
Americans’ insistence on lawfulness by waiting for the legal state militia rather than
mimicking the lawless mob violence of many white contemporaries that ultimately
contributed to their loss of political power. Oliver Cromwell’s descriptions likewise
referred to him as an “ex-convict” on numerous occasions. To circumvent the political
activity of two men fighting for their newfound rights, popular accounts discredited their
character. These depictions created an association between African American political
activity and criminality which haunts the United States even today.
The transformation of Mississippi’s state militia consequently coincided with the
degradation of African-American opportunity in Mississippi, and one man’s
extraordinary, though scarcely documented, life offers a prime illustration of how black
Mississippians experienced this transformation. Oliver Cromwell embodies the
transformation of Mississippi’s state militia as a member of that militia in 1868 and a
victim of it in 1890. His legacy exists now only in oral family histories, and his death
personified the determined, if failed, efforts of African Americans to protect their rights
and their postwar gains. Cromwell’s escape from the horrors of Leflore County only
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bought him a week. Tracked down by white supremacists, his life ended in a gunfight
where he took five of his attackers with him.171 From the Civil War, through the Clinton
Riot of 1875, to the Leflore County Massacre of 1889, Cromwell fought literally and
metaphorically until his final breath to secure rights for himself and all African
Americans in Mississippi. Though newspapers of the period often presented him in an
unfavorable light, they unknowingly preserved his myth and legacy, capturing a voice
that still deserves to be heard
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